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67
Blurring ‘the Other’: Transforming 
relations in the management of the 
1992 ethno-religious conflicts in 
Zangon Kataf, Kaduna State, Nigeria
Philip Adémóḷá Ọláyọkù*
Abstract
Nigeria, as a multi-ethnic state, has been rife with perennial conf licts 
resulting from struggles for territorial dominance, administrative and 
political legitimacy and resource control. This study thus explores the 
relational contexts of these conf licts, which are often subtended by 
contours of ethno-religious differences as was the case between the Hausa 
and Atyap in the Zangon Kataf Community of Kaduna State, Nigeria. 
The study details the historical context of manipulation of these differences 
by state actors in asserting and changing the dynamics of political legitimacy 
and control. The latter part of the paper describes qualitative research 
supporting earlier assertions. It employs a qualitative methodology with 
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the use of key informant interviews and personal observation involving 
major stakeholders within a three year period between 2011 and 2014. It 
subsequently contends that the restoration of peace in the community was 
dependent on the transformation of relations between hitherto belligerent 
parties through the adoption of the joint-problem-solving approach and a 
mediating 14-member reconciliation committee, which created a blueprint 
for political inclusion. It thus recommends an all-inclusive stakeholder 
approach in the transformation of relations for the management of 
resurging ethno-religious conf licts in the region. 
Keywords: Zangon Kataf crises, history and management, transforming 
relations, politics of inclusion
Introduction
Inter-ethnic/religious conf licts have been prevalent features in scholarly 
discourses on the political and socio-cultural relations among the diverse 
ethnic groups in Nigeria. These discourses examine conf licts (among 
ethnic groups who either co-habit or share boundaries), which result from 
claims of victimisation, neglect, oppression, discrimination, domination, 
exploitation amongst other causes (Salawu 2010:348). The occurrences of 
these conf licts usually take the ethnic and/or religious dimensions which 
cut across the different geo-political regions in the country; prominent 
among which have been the Ife-Modakeke crisis (1997), Tiv/Jukun crisis 
(2001), Umuleri/Aguleri crises (1995, 1999), Jos crises (since 2001) and the 
Zangon Kataf crises (February, May 1992) (see CLEEN Foundation 2002; 
Toure 2003). Literature on these conf licts have focused on investigating the 
causes of ethno-religious violence as well as proffering possible solutions 
based on the conf lict dynamics. While a lot of documentation has been done 
in respect of the historical sources of the indigene/settler1 crises within 
1 The indigene/settler dichotomy, within the context of this discourse, means a situation 
where a group attempts to state claims of legitimacy and territorial control as the first 
group to settle in a community (indigenes) while the other group (settlers) is regarded as 
coming later to share the same geo-political space.
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the Zangon Kataf2 context, the purpose of my research was to advance 
scholarship on the political dynamics and temporal trajectories of the crises 
as they show the effects of the relational approach to conf lict management. 
It entailed an investigation of the intermittent roles of the state in the 
manipulation and management of difference within the contexts of the 
events leading to the Zangon Kataf 1992 post-conf lict scenario. The study, 
in the subsequent sections, historicised the context of relations between the 
Hausa and Atyap of Zangon Kataf within the political, social and economic 
spectra from the precolonial through to the postcolonial era. It concludes 
that the mutual identification of sources of violent conf licts is fundamental 
to managing them by transforming relations as showcased by the efforts 
of the fourteen-member reconciliation committee in Zangon Kataf. This 
all-inclusive stakeholder model is thus important in managing historical 
communal conf licts between belligerent groups as it is fundamental to the 
restoration of social relations for stability in troubled communities.
Methodology
The methodology for this research involved key informant interviews with 
5 lawyers, 30 adult male and 25 adult female Atyap and Hausa indigenes of 
Zangon Kataf, who included the Hausa district head, members of the Atyap 
Ruling Council, elders in Zangon Kataf Community, and youth leaders. 
The interviews were held between April 2011 and September 2014. Four 
legal counsel involved in the legal proceedings of the post-1992 Zangon 
Kataf conf licts were also consulted. The interviews were corroborated with 
personal observations and visits to significant sites such as the market, 
the Agwatyap’s palace, community boundary locations, the farms, a mass 
grave site and the central meeting point. The research was conducted using 
an interview guide with semi-structured questions and a recorder where 
permitted. The identity of some interviewees have been protected, based on 
their requests and in line with the ethical guide for the research. Archival 
materials from the National Archives and grey literature, including 
2  Zangon Kataf is located in Kaduna State, North-central Nigeria. 
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correspondence and reports of various commissions of inquiry, were 
also consulted. Field research was conducted during a period of security 
apprehensions within Kaduna State, with sporadic attacks by Boko Haram 
insurgents in various parts of the state. This restricted access to state sources 
as there were lots of bureaucratic bottlenecks due to security concerns. 
A major challenge for this research was the lack of official documentation 
of the crises in National and State libraries, and other research centres. 
This made it necessary to rely on individual collections in private chambers 
and libraries for the collation of written sources which served as grey 
literature. The major challenge with this was that some of the documents 
were not well preserved, while other vital documents had been lost to fire 
outbreaks, as was the case with work by a renowned researcher on Zangon 
Kataf at the Ahmadu Bello University in Zaria. In spite of these challenges, 
relevant gatekeepers were identified to help with the snowball sampling of 
respondents and this aided the collection of data for this study. A research 
guide also helped in facilitating the interview sessions with non-English 
speaking respondents. 
Historicising the Atyap/Hausa political and socio-
economic relations in Zangon Kataf
The well documented crises of February and May 1992 emanated from the 
initial resistance of the Hausa, on 6 February 1992, against the relocation 
of the central market to Magamiya Road. The socio-economic implication 
of this territorial redefinition was the potential power shift from the 
Hausa to the Atyap regarding the control of the economic relations in 
Zangon Kataf. As some Hausa respondents recounted, the decision by a 
newly elected Atyap-led Local Government administration was aimed at 
displacing them from the market; thereby denying them their major means 
of livelihood. Beyond the underpinning economic argument, the age-old 
religious rivalry between both groups was also a mobilisation factor during 
the crises. The Hausa maintained that the new market encroached on their 
place of worship, and that this implied an attempt of the Christian Atyap 
to defile their religion. As Ahmed, one of the Hausa respondents recalled:
71
Transforming relations in the management of 1992 ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria
You cannot blame people for protecting a place where they worship. 
They flouted a court injunction because they were in charge (of the local 
government). That was it …. We told them to obey the court injunction and 
they refused. The law is the law. Who do you blame for that? 
As was observed during the research, the historical context of inter-ethnic 
relations in Zangon Kataf is one in which ethnic identity is synonymous 
with religion, which remains a significant factor in the creation and 
maintenance of relations with the other. Thus, religion was ‘a sign post for 
group boundaries’ (see Caselli and Coleman 2012:29). An understanding 
of the intersection between religion and identity is thus fundamental to 
situating the roles of state actors in the management of the Zangon Kataf 
crises within the right ethno-political context. While the narratives 
on economic cum religious causes are quite informative as regards the 
immediate causes of the May 1992 Zangon Kataf crises, there have been 
studies which indicate that the crises were rooted in a history of hostile 
social relations between the Hausa and the Atyap, the two major ethnic 
groups in the area.3 Toure (2003) traced the history of antagonistic 
relations among the groups to the 1897 military raids of an Emir of Zazzau, 
Mohammed Lawal, which were carried out in his bid to extend the Zaria 
Emirate south-eastwards to Atyapland. The resulting hostilities led to the 
evacuation of the Hausa residents from the area in the same year, for fear 
of reprisal attacks by the Atyap. The Hausa reportedly did not return until 
the British invaded the area in 1903, though the raids continued between 
1900 and 1902. Animosities between the two groups further escalated with 
the appointment of a Hausa district head (from Zaria) in Zangon Kataf 
at the introduction of the District System in 1907 (Kazah-Toure 2003). 
The appointment, according to informants, led to several acts of resistance 
3 Zangon Kataf, as a district under colonial rule, is reputed to be cosmopolitan with other 
notable groups in the area namely the Ikulu, Tacherak (Kachecere), Fulani, Angan 
(Kamatan), Bajju (Kaje) and Fulani. See Re-assessment Report on Katab District Zaria 
Province by Mr H.M. Brice-Smith (Source: National Archives Ibadan-NAI) and Kazah-
Toure (2003). However, the town’s cosmopolitan outlook today encompasses people 
of different ethnic extractions including the Igbo, Edo, Ijaw and Tiv as was discovered 
during the fieldwork.
72
Philip Adémól  l y
by the Atyap against what they perceived as a political disenfranchisement 
within their homeland. One such action was the refusal to pay taxes via 
the official channels, and intermittent questioning of the educational 
competence of the district head. During this period, an administrative 
solution was devised to douse hostilities through the appointment of some 
Atyap indigenes as chiefs or village heads at the lowest cadre of governance 
within the new political structure.
The political structure in the Zangon Kataf District, as documented in 
1922, included the district head (also known as Katuka), assisted by a 
district mallam (teacher/instructor), a messenger, three dogorai (palace/
district guards), a forest guard and a cattle inspector, who were all Hausa.4 
The judicial system of the district was also altered with the introduction 
of area courts, which were being run by Islamic Law. According to the 
1922 assessment report, the courts were headed by the Hausa Alkali and 
administered with three other Hausa assistants who sat along ‘pagan 
assessors’. The label ‘pagan assessor’, used in reference to non-Hausa/
Muslims, who practised the traditional religion at the time, corroborated 
the claim that the political structure in the North discriminated against 
non-Hausa/Muslim groups (including the Atyap). As such, their inclusion 
in the administrative and judicial systems of the district logically resulted 
from their continuous agitations against what they considered Hausa 
oppression. According to Buba Mannasseh, a member of the Atyap Youth 
Forum:
…There was never a time we have accepted subjugation in our history 
… an Atyap man is a strong willed individual with dignity, but also peace 
loving. That was why it was easy for the missionaries when they came here. 
We are (majorly) Christians and the Hausa are not comfortable with this. 
Jihad never got to us, we fought them back before the white men imposed 
the emirs on us ….
Several Atyap informants referred to the documented continuous resistance 
of their forebears to the census being conducted by the Hausa on behalf 
4 Re-assessment Report on Katab District Zaria Province.
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of the British colonial administration as evidence of their protests against 
policies of socio-political exclusion. The reason generally adduced for 
this was that they considered themselves more competent than the Hausa 
in terms of carrying out this task, as figures were often manipulated in 
favour of the Hausa who count non-humans as part of their number. These 
census-based controversies were also captured by the 1922 re-assessment 
report which ref lected irregularities in figures, wherein boys were counted 
as men in the Zangon Kataf District, apparently for the purposes of 
taxation. Following from this, the Atyap resisted the census because they 
felt they were being over-taxed since censuses were conducted to monitor 
the taxation regime. In certain instances, the Atyap were reported to have 
resisted disproportionate tax charges which they considered unjust. The 
Atyap resistance to the Native Authority administration continued till the 
post-independent era as violent demonstrations involving them and other 
groups were reported to have taken place between 1946 and 1966 (Suberu 
1996:50). 
The Hausa in Zangon Kataf are well renowned as traders. Little wonder 
there is a historical link between the profession and their earliest presence 
in the town. The first Hausa to arrive in the town is identified as Mele, a 
successful trader who contributed significantly to the market activities in 
the town. Mele is said to have invited his kinsmen to join him at Zango, a 
town renowned for its commercial significance dating as far back as the 
early 20th century. The blossoming economy thus conferred a cosmopolitan 
status on the town, which has residents from different parts of the country. 
The Zangon Kataf market was the largest in the district, situated ‘on 
the main trade routes from the North to Jemaa, Keffi, Abuja and Bida 
in the South and from Bauchi and Jos to the South and West’5. Due to 
its geographical centrality, it was a stop where traders, either travelling 
northward or southward, took breaks from their journeys. The market 
retains its historical significance as a viable centre of economic activities till 
the present, giving credence to economic undertones of the root causes of 
5 Re-assessment Report on Katab District Zaria Province.
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the 1992 crises in addition to religious, ethnic and political undercurrents. 
From a historical perspective, the political marginalisation of the Atyap 
under the colonial structure further punctuated the hostilities between 
them and the Hausa, resulting in intermittent clashes that climaxed in the 
well documented 1992 market crises which left over 1 528 people killed, 
518 injured, 133 houses destroyed and 26 farms vandalised (Akinteye et al. 
1999; Kazah-Toure 2003; Madugba 2001; Suberu 1996). While it is beyond 
the scope of this paper to detail the crises, it is important to note that the 
historical context of antagonistic relations between the two groups guided 
the interventions of the 14-member reconciliation committee which 
emphasised transforming these relations to restore sustainable peace in the 
community.
The State and the exploitation of difference in Nigeria 
The roles of the state in the manipulation of difference among indigenous 
ethnic groups in Nigeria were aptly captured by Awe (1999:4–13), who traced 
the shift from the inclusive accommodating pre-colonial politics through 
the emergence of exclusive colonial politics to the corrupt and oppressive 
political climate in post-independent Nigeria. The assertion of Awe that 
there had been political structures (either centralised or decentralised) in 
pre-colonial Nigeria, which were altered through the introduction of new 
social political orders by colonialists (both Mediterranean6 and Western), 
has been well corroborated in extant literature by renowned politicians, 
historians and scholars such as Lugard (1922), Stride and Ifeka (1971), 
Ikime (1980), Ade Ajayi (1989), Alagoa (1992), Falola and Heaton (2008). 
The introduction of the indirect rule system (as shown in the Zangon Kataf 
scenario above) was a paradigmatic shift in the content, focus, nature and 
methods of political rule in hitherto independent communities which 
became a conglomerate on 14 January 1914 in the bid to create a modern 
Nigerian state (Lugard 1922; Awe 1999:8; Nast 2005:140). 
6 Kazah-Toure (2003) well documented the pre-British colonial antecedents of raids by 
Jihadists in Southern Zaria.
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Similarly, Heidi Nast’s historical analysis of slavery and concubinage 
within the political institution in Kano concluded with instances of how 
Kano’s political and economic structures were replaced with the advent of 
colonial rule, despite the seeming respect for and preservation of traditional 
institutions (Nast 2005:139–165). Awe, from a broader spectrum, 
categorically stated that ‘What was supposed to be an indirect rule was in 
reality a direct one that ignored the traditional institutions of government’. 
She exemplified this with the Northern Emirate System within which emirs 
became ‘colonial agents’ in Muslim communities, while the Non-Muslim 
areas of the North had ‘British supported chiefs’ imposed on their hitherto 
independent political heads (Awe 1999:8). This is akin to the redefinition 
of political leadership contexts in colonial Francophone Africa as discussed 
by Geschiere (2009:15). Therein, though autochthonous groups (people of 
the land) were identified with particular territories, the control of these 
territories was reassigned to imposed non-indigenous chiefs (allogenes) 
considered to be more industrious than the ‘backward locals’. This 
colonial method of governance was thus a violence-based power relation 
which was purportedly meant to prevent the African from degeneracy and 
vice, thus redefining his socio-political identity as well as geography for 
economic benefits (Mbembe 1992:18). Subsequently, this defined relations 
as the masses became further separated from governance whereby the 
state became embodied in autocratic individuals in post-colonial contexts, 
as hitherto well defined identities became f luid in well-manipulated 
incoherent socio-political climates (Mbembe 1992:7, 5). It is important 
to note that this alien operational model of the colonialists, which made 
the governed unconditionally submissive, never gained legitimacy among 
Africans. The introduction of the indirect rule system in Northern Nigeria 
was thus significant in the creation of fears and suspicion among the other 
indigenous groups against the ruling hegemony of the Hausa, Fulani, Nupe 
and Kanuri, as noted by the Willinks Commission in 1954.7 The change 
7  See Nigeria: Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Fears of Minorities 
and the Means of Allaying Them. Presented to the Parliament by the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies by command of Her Majesty, July 1958. 
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in the political atmosphere subsequently led to the colonial redefinition 
of identity and space along the indigene/settler paradigm, which further 
crystallised the struggles over land ownership, self-determination and 
socio-cultural control (Nwosu 1999; Osaghae and Suberu 2005:17). 
The importance of clarifying the historical context of the shift in 
relationships between the state and the governed in Nigeria follows from 
Mamdani’s (2002:766–767) argument against the cultural theory of politics, 
which interprets political actions and their consequences synchronically as 
opposed to the diachronic interpretation of realities within the historical 
context. The latter helps in the proper placement of events within the 
right politico-historical context; thus providing an objective basis for 
understanding such events and their root causes. Within this diachronic 
context, one could clearly understand that the indirect rule policy, rather 
than provide an inclusive social ambience, which was fronted with the 
inclusion of indigenous regents and chiefs within a new political order, 
resulted in further fractionalisation of communities. This was because 
people felt alienated under the new governance regime of compulsion, as 
opposed to the precolonial participatory politics where leaders prioritised 
accountability to their community. 
This distortion of political administration changed the political destiny 
and right to territoriality of indigenous groups of Northern Nigeria, bred 
dissension among the Hausa and non-Hausa groups, led to crises and 
the breakdown of peace processes within the broader context of ‘ethnic 
stereotypification’ as it was in the case of Zangon Kataf. As against the 
manufactured stereotypes of Hausa domination in Zangon Kataf, Hausa 
residents decried the fact that they were also politically excluded as 
most political decisions were taken from Zaria without their knowledge 
or participation. This contradiction thus presents them as being both 
politically (having no say in governance) and socially alienated (as they 
were not considered indigenous to Zangon Kataf). Within the broader 
Nigerian context, the alienation of the governed from administration also 
had socio-economic implications as colonialism bred class distinctions 
between the educated elites and the so-called unlettered people, with 
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new identities of the sophisticated urbanised and the less developed rural 
populations.
Identity, space and the management of difference within 
the Zangon Kataf context 
Awe (1999:10–13) identified ethno-religious sentiments, corruption and 
the ‘oil curse’ as responsible factors for further exclusion of the masses 
from governance in post-colonial Nigeria. The politics of elite recycling 
and self-perpetuation in power, which included a long interjection of 
military dictatorships, has further distanced the ruled from governance. 
In particular, ethno-religious manipulations remain ready tools in the 
hands of political elites through which they hunt down rivals in attaining 
and maintaining political power and wealth (Ibeanu 2000; Ukiwo 
2005; Stewart 2009). The emergent post-colonial relations from such 
manipulations could well be described with Mbembe’s (1992:5) ‘mutual 
zombification’ whereby political actors and the governed coexist in separate 
but interrelated spaces – with changing identities to fit into specific socio-
political contexts often driven by interests and benefits beyond their design 
and control.
The dynamics of these constantly changing identities and relationships, 
within the Nigerian context, is such that they have overlapping macro 
(national) and micro (state and local government) layers. An understanding 
of the interrelatedness and interdependence of group relations at these 
three governance levels is thus significant in the management of hostile 
relationships among warring ethno-religious factions. It is the formation 
of such ever dynamic and complex relations that validates the need for a 
transformation of hostile relations by integrating the conf licting parties 
within the conf lict management process. This approach probes beyond 
framed positions to redressing societal structures and institutions within 
a gradual process of attaining win-win outcomes for parties in conf lict 
(Miall 2004:3). This is premised on the fact that root causes of violent 
conf licts are not usually limited to the immediate location of the conf licts, 
with relationships having degenerated over time. The context of the 
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Zangon Kataf conf lict scenario as presented above consequently reiterates 
the degeneration of relations over time between the Hausa and the Atyap 
(see Kazah-Toure 2003; Osinubi and Osinubi 2006; Adeleye et al. 1999; 
and Adebanwi 2007), which needed to be reversed in restoring peace to the 
communities. The inclusive approach of the Kaduna State Government in 
inaugurating a fourteen-member reconciliation committee to unearth the 
remote and immediate causes of the crises was accordingly a significant step 
at transforming relationships through dialogue, in order to restore peace to 
the area. Going beyond the framed immediate causes8 of aggression by each 
of the opposing groups, the committee explored the underlying effects of 
political exclusion that bred violence over time, so as to help both parties 
trade mutually beneficial concessions to allow for a more inclusive socio-
political climate in Zangon Kataf.
This intervention validated the importance of an inclusive space for a stable 
polity as underscored by Malpas (2004) who advocated the need to unpack 
cross-cultural intersections of place and identity in conf lict contexts. This 
is because the self is defined according to experiential relations with other 
‘subjects’ and ‘objects’ within a particular space (Malpas 2004:4–10). 
The link between place and identity in Zangon Kataf was captured by 
Adebanwi (2007:216, 238) in describing the space-dependent power 
relations among the Hausa/Atyap groups as a battle for territoriality. 
He defines territoriality as the enlivening or empowerment of space in 
which ‘possession’, and by implication control, of a territory empowers 
individuals or groups with ownership claims to dominate and control others 
within that particular territory. The potentiality for such control enhances 
ethnic mobilisations among groups who are often engaged in political, 
economic, demographic, ecological and cultural competitions within 
shared spaces (see Wilkes and Okamoto 2002:3–4). These competitions 
expand the dimensions of relations beyond those between persons and 
communities, to their interactions with land and the environment. 
8 The market relocation (in February 1992) and the uprooting of crops from farmlands (in 
May 1992) were immediate causes but not the root causes of the crises, as the interventions 
of the Rahila Cudjoe Commission of Inquiry showed. 
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The factors highlighted intermittently emerged during interviews with 
both the Hausa and Atyap residents as the bases for ethno-religious 
mobilisation in the build-up to the 1992 market crises in Zangon Kataf, 
with the overarching themes of identity and territoriality underlining 
the spill-over of violence to other parts of Kaduna State. The struggle for 
political control of the Zangon Kataf District (and subsequently the local 
government), between the Atyap and the Hausa, is linked to the perceived 
demographic threats of the Hausa whose number significantly increased 
over time resulting in the encroachment – with the help of the British – 
into land belonging to the Atyap. With the Hausa dominating Zango town, 
a space located in the heart of the Atyapland central to their economic 
existence and survival, the Atyap suspected a conspiracy to further 
disengage them from their land.9
The Atyap, like other predominantly agro-economic cultures, regarded 
land as central to their economic existence. In line with their tradition, 
they do not give out land permanently but lease it to visitors for an 
agreed period of time, after which they are expected to return it.10 
From a cultural perspective, there were also conf licts regarding the belief 
and legal systems, linguistic dominance, and inter-ethnic marriages 
amongst others. For instance, with the Islamic religion considering 
traditional religious practice as paganism, the introduction of the Sharia 
legal system by the colonial administration was resisted by the Atyap, who 
considered it a defiance of their traditional legal culture. This religious 
otherness was further accentuated when the Atyap embraced Christianity. 
The Atyap particularly complained against the condemnation of their local 
alcoholic drink (Burukutu), and the impossibility of having daughters-
in-law from Hausa extraction. The dominance of Hausa as the lingua 
franca in Zangon Kataf, as in most parts of the North, was also considered 
as a threat to the Atyap language and culture with the younger generations 
losing touch. Suffice it to state that the dichotomy in the relations between 
9 Interview with Assistant Commissioner of Police (ACP) Jury Ayok (retired).
10 Interview with Maj. Gen. Zamani Lekwot (retired). 
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these two groups extended beyond the microcosm of Zangon Kataf local 
government to the macrocosm of Hausa/non-Hausa distinctions in other 
parts of Northern Nigeria. 
The State and identity politics in the management of the 
1992 Zangon Kataf crises 
The macro dimension of the Atyap/Hausa stereotypical relations was one 
of overlapping identities in the post-February/May 1992 violent crises. 
The Kaduna State government, which had set up a commission of inquiry 
named The Zangon Kataf (Market) Riots Commission of Inquiry after the 
February crisis, extended the mandate of the commission to examining the 
causes and actors of the May crises, which began while the commission was 
yet to submit its report. Within the historical circumstances of prevailing 
differentiation, the Atyap considered the composition of the commission 
and its procedures as very unfavourable to their cause. This was, firstly, 
because the seven-member commission11 was composed of 6 Muslims and 
only one Christian, Mr William Shera, who was not trusted to be capable 
of representing their interests.12 As some informants opined, the second 
reason was hinged on territoriality, with claims that the location of the 
commission’s hearing in Kawo, Kaduna State, was deliberately chosen to 
prevent them from attending the proceedings, given its distance which 
made accessibility difficult for aged and maimed witnesses. There was 
therefore an interplay of territoriality, ethnic sentimentality and religious 
biases trailing the perception of this state-led intervention by both groups. 
Thus, while the Hausa were pleased with the initiation, procedures and 
outcomes of the sittings of the commission, the Atyap refrained from 
making official representation at the commission’s public hearings. 
For them, the Hausa had their kith and kin (in government) controlling the 
whole intervention process, and this did not guarantee justice. 
11 The Commission was chaired by Hon. Justice Rahila Hadea Cudjoe and the other 
members were Massoud A. Oredola, William P. Shera, Ja’afaru Makarfi, Garba Galadima, 
Abbas Usman and Musa Gaiya.
12 Interview with Anonymous Atyap Respondent.
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At about the same period, the federal military government under General 
Ibrahim Babaginda set up two judicial tribunals under Section 2(1) and 
(2) of the Civil Disturbances (Special Tribunal) Decree No 2. of 1987 as 
amended. These tribunals were to focus on the causes of the civil and 
communal disturbances of Zangon Kataf town. The first tribunal, which 
was chaired by Hon. Justice B. O. Okadigbo, a retired high court judge, 
comprised six members and tried twenty-three suspects; while the second, 
headed by Mr. Justice E. A. Adegbite, was made up of seven persons and 
tried thirty persons.13 It is important to note that those tried were part of 
a total of about sixty-two Atyap elites (that included chiefs, high ranking 
civil servants, retired servicemen, intellectuals and senior pastors) who 
were arrested by security agents and kept in custody. Sources of this study 
did not ref lect any major Hausa personality arrested in the aftermath of 
the crises.14
Consequently, the arrest of key members of the Atyap group by the federal 
government was considered a macro dimension of Hausa injustice within 
Northern Nigerian politics. It was indeed emphasised, during interview 
sessions with some of the arrested victims, that the then president, 
General Ibrahim Babangida, visited the scene of the crisis on 26 May 1992, 
and wept. He was credited with the assertion that ‘all those arrested in 
13 See Confirmation of the Judgements of the Judicial Tribunals on Civil and Communal 
Disturbances at Zango-Kataf, Kaduna State. A Memorandum presented to the National 
Defence and Security Council by the President, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed forces 
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, General Ibrahim Babangida on 14th June, 1993.
14 The creation of the tribunals of Inquiry by the Federal Military government which sat 
at the same period with the state commission on inquiry indicated the possibility of a 
special interest by the government in the crises. The creation of two tribunals sitting 
simultaneously reflected the government’s intention to hasten its decision-making 
process as the case was practically ‘hijacked’ from the state commission, which could not 
interrogate the suspects and had to take its decisions without their representation as was 
contained in its final report. A similar approach was adopted by the Okadigbo-led tribunal 
who took its decision without the representation of the defence counsel for the accused 
Atyap since they had to withdraw from the case with the promulgation of retroactive 
decrees by the federal government to further indict the suspects. These procedural 
challenges on the part of the government, both at the federal and state levels, were largely 
responsible for the little impacts of their interventions.
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connection with the crisis will be declared guilty until they are proven 
innocent’. This statement was regarded as malicious and is believed to have 
impacted the outcome of the tribunal’s proceedings. It was reported by 
Akintunde and others (1993), that along with the president’s interest, the 
secretary to the state government, Aliyu Mohammed, also took personal 
interest in the proceedings having lost two of his nephews during the crises. 
The reason given by the then president when asked for reacting differently 
to the Zangon Kataf crises was that ‘the mode of destruction in Zangon-
Kataf (sic) did not allow for compliance with the normal procedure 
of dissolving a local government council’ (Akintunde et al. 1993:13). 
The dissolution of the Atyap-led Zangon Kataf local government inferred 
the loss of territorial inf luence of the Atyap in local politics. For the Hausa, 
the removal of the then local government chairman was justified, having 
suffered major casualties during the crises. The Hausa informants maintain 
that the arrest of the Atyap ought to be considered appropriate since they 
were responsible for initiating the crises and they (the Hausa) were only 
defending themselves. Without attempting to delve into the debate on the 
root cause(s) of the crises, what could be deduced is that the utterances of 
people in government (considered to have strong affinity to the Hausa) and 
the imbalance in the composition of the membership of the commission 
and tribunals (which were dominated by Muslims) further instigated 
ethno-religiously motivated hostilities between both groups.
The manner of arrest of some of the later convicted suspects was also one 
that left the feeling that the Atyap would not get justice from the federal 
government’s interventions. For instance, Major General Lekwot, the most 
prominent arrested suspect in connection with the violence, recounted 
in an interview that on 19 May 1992, he had been invited to the police 
headquarters in Kaduna by Assistant Commissioner of Police (ACP) Uba 
Ringim, who was sent from the force headquarters in Lagos. On getting 
there, he was taken to the Wuse police station in Abuja where he was 
eventually thrown, with no opportunity for discussion or defence, into a 
cell close to hardened criminals. Likewise, a day later, ACP Jury Baba Ayok 
(retired) (the displaced local government chairman) and Major Atomie Kude 
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(retired) alongside nineteen other Atyap elites were invited for a meeting in 
Zonkwa, only to be conveyed in waiting buses by the Police Commissioner 
Simeon Adeoye to Gabasawa police station in Kaduna without any warrant 
or explanation. From the Atyap account, the continuous victimisation of 
their elites around Kaduna town lasted for about two months with the total 
number of those detained in Kaduna prison put at sixty-two.15
Sourcing for sustainable peace: The Committee for 
Reconciliation and the search for lasting peace for the 
Zangon Kataf community 
The government of Kaduna State subsequently initiated steps to ensure 
the restoration of sustainable peace to Zangon Kataf after initial attempts 
failed to restore stability to the area. In doing this, they adopted a non-
adversarial means of inclusive dialogue by holding a series of meetings with 
representatives of both Atyap and Hausa communities. The informants, 
from both ends, expressed how this was a welcome development as an 
all-inclusive dialogue was crucial to reversing the strained relationships 
between them. As one of the committee members opined:
…The committee was balanced. The government ensured this through 
consultations and by bringing in equal representations based on the 
recommendation of both us (Hausa) and the Atyap. You must know that it 
was a thorough process in making these choices; the governor was careful 
in choosing the mediator (Late Air Vice-Marshall Mu’azu) to coordinate 
the committee …. But again, it is all about the implementation. Go through 
our recommendations, some have yielded results, others did not see the 
light of the day. In any case, we sat together to discuss the crises and make 
recommendations ….
This joint problem-solving approach encapsulated an agreement by the 
representatives of both ethnic groups on 14 November 1994 that each would 
submit seven names for the formation of a fourteen-member reconciliation 
committee with a ‘neutral, responsible and impartial’ person within the 
15 See The Addendum to the Kataf Community Memorandum of 30th July, 1999, p. 9.
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state to serve as an arbitrator.16 The Military Administrator of Kaduna 
State, Col. Lawal Ja’afaru Isa, in a letter dated 30 November 1994, formally 
informed the Late Air Vice-Marshall Usman Mu’azu (then retired) about 
his nomination as arbitrator to facilitate the meetings of the committee.17 
The chairmanship of the committee was to be alternated during the 
various sessions while Alhaji Hussani Hayatu served as the secretary of 
the committee. A Hausa committee member, in an interview, stated that 
the balance in the committee’s representation was sufficient to make it 
credible, as it allowed for detailed considerations of the perceptions of both 
groups on the remote and immediate causes of the crises.18
The terms of reference of the committee were thus highlighted as follows:
•	 Explore the possibility of addressing both the remote and the immediate 
causes of the disturbances of Zangon Kataf in February and May 1992.
•	 Determine the ingredients for lasting peace in Zangon Kataf.
•	 Determine and suggest strategies on how this desirable lasting peace 
can be achieved.
•	 Submit findings and recommendations within three weeks of 
inauguration.
The committee was inaugurated on 15 December 1994 at the Igabi State 
House Lodge, Kawo, Kaduna State. The committee adopted a methodology, 
which took cognizance of incorporating major stakeholders within the 
intervention process. It included fact-finding visits to eminent personalities 
such as traditional rulers, representatives of affected communities and 
religious organisations, as well as esteemed personalities and leaders 
of thought in the Zangon Kataf Local Government, and Kaduna town. 
16 Letter on Committee for Reconciliation and the Search for Lasting Peace at Zangon Kataf 
Ref: GH/KD/S/268/S.1/T/1 dated 30th November, 1994.
17 The other members of the committee stated in the letter included Dan Kato, Zakari Sogfa, 
Francis Mutuah, Joshua Bityong, Ninak Shekari, Jury Ayok and Duniya Bungon for the 
Atyap Community; and Ibrahim Zango, A. T. K. Lawal, Muhammad Inuwa, Mohammed 
El-Idris, Aliyu Magaji, Kabiru Mato and Ibrahim Bisallah for the Hausa community.
18 Interview with Dr Kabir Mato in his Office at Emeka Anyaoku Street in Abuja, 
20 November 2012.
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The second part of the methodology involved the analysis of findings from 
the above engagements; and the third part focused on the treatment of the 
terms of reference. 
This initiative was also given legitimacy by residents of the state as ref lected 
in their various feedbacks to the secretariat of the committee. Notable 
among such feedbacks was the letter of the Emir of Birnin Gwari, Mallam 
Zubair Jibril Maigwari II, which he entitled ‘Proposal on Zangon Kataf ’. 
Writing from his experience as a vice-principal of a secondary school 
in Zangon Kataf at the time of the crises, he articulated the politics of 
difference as a root cause resulting from ill-feelings introduced by the civil-
servants, businessmen, and retired and serving soldiers. These actors, for 
him, had inordinate cravings for wealth, political and territorial control. In 
his view, the solution may not be merely rebuilding the communities and 
resettling the victims, but also ensuring fairness to all the parties. Among 
other things, he proposed that the farms in contention should be rebuilt, 
expanded and transformed into a national village where people of different 
ethnic affiliations could live alongside members of the community who 
remain behind.19 
The representatives of the Zangon Kataf Local Government Communities 
also submitted a joint memorandum to the committee which contained 
three resolutions. These representatives comprised the Bajju Development 
Association, Ikulu Development Association, Kamatan Development 
Association and the Kataf (Atyap) Youth Development Association. 
From this coalition of the non-Hausa indigenes in the area, the first 
request was the immediate unconditional release of all those arbitrarily 
jailed in connection with the crisis to allow for meaningful negotiations. 
Secondly, they demanded equal recognition of all the ethnic groups in 
the area through the creation of chiefdoms to ensure political inclusion 
through self-determination, and thirdly that efforts at restructuring the 
19 Letter of the Emir of Birnin Gwari, Mallam Zubair Jibril Maigwari II, entitled ‘Proposal 
on Zangon Kataf’ to Air Vice-Marshall Usman Mu’azu (retired) dated 24 January 1995. 
BGEC/PER/VOL.1/54–95.
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community and reintegrating different ethnic and religious groups be 
made following the examples of Zonkwa, Unguwar Rimi, Samaru-Kataf 
and Kagoro in which hitherto hostile relations have been transformed.20 
Some points were also made by the Igbo community’s leader, Chief Cyprian 
Ihejiahi. He corroborated the need for an Atyap chiefdom, the creation of 
an integrated settlement for all residents of Zangon Kataf with its own 
community development association, cooperative unions and social clubs. 
He finally pleaded for equal compensation for all victims of the Zangon 
Kataf February/May Crises, and the release of all the innocent convicts 
in prison.21 These recommendations took cognizance of the importance 
of creating a safe space through integration, by which territoriality and 
ethno-religious disparities are downplayed.
The committee sat and submitted its report in March 1995, which contained 
their terms of reference, ingredients for reconciliation and some cardinal 
points. The first part of the report dealt with the immediate and remote 
causes of the instability and disturbances in Zangon Kataf. The four 
immediate causes identified included the manipulation of the vulnerable 
youth population; negative reactions of individuals, communities and 
interest groups to the February crises; the Government/Emirate Council’s 
attitude to the February and May 1992 crises; and the market relocation to 
the new site. 
It emerged that the failure of the political leadership to provide economic 
security in Nigeria had disempowered the youths and made them vulnerable 
to elite manipulation. In the bid for political and territorial control by the 
elites of the warring groups, the media was identified as a tool for instilling 
negative sentiments among members, especially the youth, through bias 
20 Letter of the Zangon Kataf Communities entitled ‘The Stand of Zangon Kataf Local 
Government Communities on the Zangon Kataf Peace Committee’, dated 19 January 
1995.
21 Letter by the president of the Igbo Community Welfare Association Kaduna, Chief 
Cyprian Ihejiahi, entitled ‘A Brief Written Confirmation of Chief Cyprian Ihejiahi’s Oral 
Statement as a Witness to the Zangon/Kataf Reconciliation Committee Meeting in State 
House, Kawo’, dated 14 February 1995.
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and sensational reportage. The committee affirmed Awe’s (1999) argument 
on the contradictions between post-colonial political administration and 
the governed by identifying the quartet of the Federal government, Kaduna 
State Government, the Zangon Kataf Local Government administration 
and the Emirate council as culpable parties in the aftermath of the February 
crises. The post-violence reactions from these political actors were 
specifically criticised based on the ethnicisation and politicisation of their 
interventions. In addressing the root causes, the committee emphasised 
the need to educate the populace on de-emphasising ethno-religious 
sentiments and struggle over territoriality. This was to be done through 
an all-inclusive educational system which bridges the inherited Islamic/
Missionary educational divide. It affirmed the need for the new market 
in addressing its requisite expansion, but its establishment should allow 
for social and administrative inclusion of all stakeholders. The committee 
also identified the importance of addressing the feelings of dissociation of 
the people from their political affairs, and afterwards recommended self-
determination for the Atyap through the creation of the Atyap chiefdom.
The Atyap Chiefdom was restored under the government of Alhaji Ahmed 
Makarfi, alongside about twenty-five other chiefdoms belonging to non-
Hausa indigenous groups. The Chiefdom is headed by the Agwatyap III, 
currently Mr Dominic Gambo Yahaya,22 alongside the Atyap ruling council 
that includes representatives of residents from other ethnic extractions. 
The numerical strength of the Hausa population was also considered in 
choosing a Hausa district head for Zango town, who is also incorporated 
into the Atyap ruling council. This inclusive politics has been critical 
to maintaining peace in the town. The Hausa and Atyap groups, in the 
aftermath of the committee’s intervention, developed alliances through 
the Atyap/Hausa Youth forum, a gathering of youths from both ethnic 
extractions where discussions on security and developmental projects 
in the chiefdom are made. This forum was adduced as the reason for the 
22 HRH Sir Dominic Gambo Yahaya was the local government chairman of Zangon Kataf 
during fieldwork for this study and served as a major respondent, having being arrested 
after the 1992 crises. He was installed on 12 November 2016.
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non-occurrence of the deadly Boko Haram attacks in Atyapland, despite the 
fact that some neighbouring communities were affected. From the political 
perspective, the late Agwatyap II, HRH Dr Harrison Yusuf Bunggwon, was 
credited for ensuring the peaceful conduct of the 2011 and 2015 elections 
in the chiefdom, through a series of community meetings with residents 
on the need to avoid violence during the elections. As a way of sustaining 
smooth relations among the Hausa and Atyap, their children are made to 
attend the same primary and secondary schools where they are taught to 
inculcate a culture of acceptance and peaceful coexistence.
In the committee’s report, the historical, social, cultural and religious 
antecedents of the Hausa were identified as responsible factors for the kind 
of secluded pattern of settlement which to some extent alienated them 
from the Atyap. In managing this, the committee urged the government 
to expand the Zangon Kataf town to accommodate the integration of 
other ethnic groups. The expansion was to be done through a new layout 
which includes the provision of facilities that will aid social interactions. 
During the fieldwork, some residents of the town confirmed that plans 
for the new layout have been approved by the state government to cover 
areas surrounding the Agwatyap’s palace, and the goal is to ensure the 
integration of all resident ethnic groups into the community. 
In concluding its report, the committee acknowledged the willingness of 
both communities to restore serenity and cordial relationships in Zangon 
Kataf. It however drew attention to three areas in which there was stalemate 
and therefore needed the government’s urgent attention. These were the 
resolution of ownership of the disputed farmlands, the release of the white 
paper on the Justice Cudjoe Commission of Inquiry, and the release of 
the detainees. With the benefit of hindsight, the informants maintained 
that the government, through a series of meetings with stakeholders from 
both parties, was able to amicably resolve the disputes on land ownership. 
This largely entailed the Atyap conceding to accommodate the Hausa within 
the Atyap Chiefdom. The whitepaper on the Justice Cudjoe Commission of 
Enquiry was also released, though the procedures and recommendations 
of the commission remain unacceptable to the Atyap. It is currently 
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available online on the website of the Kaduna State government. Suffice 
it to state that the verdict passed by the Okadigbo tribunal included death 
sentences on six prominent members of the Atyap community including 
Maj. Gen. Zamani Lekwot (retired), a former military administrator in 
Rivers State from 1975 to 1978. The sentence, which was a subject of both 
national and international appeals, was subsequently commuted by the 
Supreme Military Council to five years imprisonment; a term which was 
fully served by them. Therefore the demand for the unconditional release 
of the Atyap elites was not met and this has an outstanding implication of 
their stigmatisation as ex-convicts in spite of several criticisms against the 
process of their conviction.
Conclusion
This study has been able to historicise the 1992 Zangon Kataf conf licts 
while examining the colonial roots of the state’s role in the manipulation 
and management of difference among co-habiting ethnic groups struggling 
for the assertion of identity and territorial control. The state interventions 
through a federal tribunal and state commission under the military 
entailed an exclusive process of convictions without fair hearings. These 
were insufficient in transforming perennial hostile relations, which led 
to the February and May 1992 crises. This study thus contends that the 
transformation of relations in the management of the crises was enhanced 
through an all-inclusive dialogue adopted by the reconciliation committee. 
This was very vital in engaging key issues that underpinned the emergence 
and escalation of conf licts in Zangon Kataf. The legitimacy of this approach 
is palpable through the involvement of different community leaders 
and associations in the reconciliation process. The effectiveness of this 
transformative method is ref lected in the creation of the Atyap Chiefdom 
with an inclusive political composition which entails representation of 
non-Atyap groups in the Agwatyap’s advisory council. The council had 
facilitated the creation of an Atyap/Hausa joint consultative forum among 
the youths of the community, which is a community-based association for 
dealing with issues of security and development. Thus, the participation of 
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members of the community further contributed to blurring of the lines of 
otherness, thereby helping to build trust and restore peace in the Chiefdom.
Recommendation
The on-going clamour for restructuring in Nigeria is indicative of the fact 
that the political arrangements of the post-modern state present certain 
historical challenges of ethnic and religious crises in the region. However, 
the government has not taken appropriate cues from history, especially 
in terms of the management of the crises – as they often use the military 
to inject quick fix solutions in conf licts where there is need to transform 
relations. The resurgence of agitations in the South-east, for instance, 
have been met with a military operation labelled ‘Exercise Egwu Eke’ 
(Operation Python Dance), which has been bedevilled with allegations of 
human rights abuses by the military. While this agitation is not in isolation, 
there is also the predominantly middle belt challenge of the Farmer/Herder 
conf licts which has recently occasioned the resurgence of crises in Zangon 
Kataf, underscored by the age-long struggle over economic and territorial 
control within the context of ethno-religious suspicion. While curfews 
and deployment may have helped in restoring cold peace to these troubled 
regions, sustainable peace can only be restored through the transformation 
of relations. It is therefore imperative that the government revisits its 
approach and embrace dialogue with all stakeholders in devising lasting 
solutions. 
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